Which were not provided for by the manufacturer or were deliberately hidden by him (for example, some manufacturers of proprietary OS do this for the purpose of unfair competition). They could later be discovered by users or third-party specialists.

In a similar sense, we can talk about undocumented functions.

In cases where the manufacturer is responsible for the performance of the product or undertakes to technical support, the corresponding obligations usually apply only to what is described in the accompanying documentation. This may be another reason for not mentioning some in the documentation. useful features. In particular, this allows you to get rid of them in future versions of the product without warning users about it. This carries certain risks for users relying on undocumented features.

Of particular interest, especially in the case software, represent undocumented capabilities that may compromise correct work, integrity, confidentiality - in other words, security - of a software or information system. In this context the term is usually used vulnerability(English translation) vulnerability) (in professional computer jargon also bug, « hole"), and in some official documents the concepts "" and " undeclared capabilities"(see section " ").

Such capabilities can be used, for example, when working in the following areas:

• computing and other hardware: computers, computer components, peripherals and accessories, as well as various electronics (alarms, mp3 players), etc.;
• means of communication: cell phones, GPS navigators, intercoms, communicators, etc.;
• software: operating systems, programming languages, various software, games, etc.;

Undocumented capabilities in various areas

In the equipment

In software

In computer and electronic games

Undeclared capabilities (information security)

In the context information security the focus is on the functionality of the software, the use of which may interfere with its proper operation, as well as the integrity or confidentiality of information. Domestic information security standards for such undocumented capabilities introduce a special concept - undeclared capabilities, used, in particular, for software certification.

For example, there is a guiding document approved by the Chairman of the State Technical Commission under the President, dedicated, in particular, to the classification of information security software according to the level of control over the absence of undeclared capabilities, which defines them as follows:

2.1. Undeclared capabilities- functionality of the software that is not described or does not correspond to those described in the documentation, the use of which may violate the confidentiality, availability or integrity of the processed information.

Functional objects intentionally included in software that have such capabilities are called software bookmarks. These terms are also used by GOST R 51275-2006. Sometimes the abbreviation " NDV».

In the literature, a concept similar in meaning, but less defined, is more common vulnerability(English translation) vulnerability).

Software bookmarks should be distinguished from undeclared features that appear as a result of errors in the program (sometimes called bugs and “holes”).

The Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation also lists among the threats to “the security of information and telecommunications means and systems” “the introduction into hardware and software products of components that implement functions not provided for in the documentation for these products.”

Examples

Technical devices and software

Examples of undocumented capabilities and commands include:

Mass culture

• The transition from the “matrix” to “reality” in the film “The Matrix” was carried out by the main characters through entering an undocumented code in the cabin of a virtual pay phone in the “matrix”.
• in episode 3.11 “Enter 77” of the series “Lost,” the transition to the basic capabilities mode, which the heroes of the series did not know, was accidentally realized by one of the characters by winning computer chess.

see also

Notes

Literature

In English

• Gupta G. Computers in Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1991. ISBN 0791806227, ISBN 9780791806227, ISBN 0-7918-0622-7 (especially the section “Documented and Undocumented Features”, p.78)
• Szyperski C., Gruntz D., Murer S.. Component software: beyond object-oriented programming. Pearson Education Publishers, 2003. ISBN 9780201178883 (especially section 5.1.5. Undocumented “features”, p.54)
• Smith Sean W. Trusted computing platforms: design & applications. 2005, XX, 244 p. 28 illus., Hardcover. ISBN 978-0-387-23916-3 (especially section 3.4 Undocumented Functionality, p.35)

In Russian

• Adamenko M.V.. Secrets cell phones: service codes mobile phones; undocumented features; change the ringtone; unlocking phones. Ed. 2nd. M.: "DMK Press, "SOLON-Press", 2002, 240 pp. - ISBN 5-98003-026-3, ISBN 5-94074-191-6
• Bukin M.S.. Secrets of cell phones. St. Petersburg: “Peter”, 2005, 208 pp. - ISBN 5-469-00638-7
• Zykov N.K.. Undocumented Windows Features: A Handbook for the Practitioner Programmer. M.: “Radio and Communication”, 1994, 176 pp. - ISBN 5-256-01212-6, ISBN 5-256-01212-6
• Kingsley-Hagis K. Undocumented GPS capabilities. St. Petersburg: “Peter”, 2007, 304 pp. - ISBN 978-5-469-01410-2
• Kobernichenko A.V.. Undocumented features of Windows NT. M.: Knowledge, 287 pp. - ISBN 5-89251-048-4
• Sven Schreiber. Undocumented features of Windows 2000. St. Petersburg, 2002, 544 pages - ISBN 5-318-00487-3
• Flenov M.. Programming in Delphi through the eyes of a hacker. Publisher: "BHV-Petersburg", 2007. ISBN 978-5-9775-0081-4

Links

Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.

See what “Undocumented capabilities” are in other dictionaries:

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Is it possible to create a registry key that will be visible in Windows as part of the active (connected) registry, but will not be visible to programs that work with the inactive (disconnected) registry? It turns out that if you only have the ability to change one kernel variable (for example, using a driver), then yes, there is a way.

Why is this necessary?

Hiding registry keys from programs that work with an inactive registry, while maintaining the ability to work normally with these keys standard means The Windows operating system (as part of the active registry) can be used to achieve two purposes:

1. hiding changes made to the registry from forensic research (for example, hiding the keys of a certain service, which will be correctly read and used by the Windows operating system during the boot process, but will not be visible to third-party programs that work with the inactive registry during the examination of the drive);
2. hiding changes made to the registry from pre-boot integrity monitoring (for example, making changes to registry keys that will not be visible to trusted boot modules during integrity monitoring, but will be visible to the Windows operating system itself).

How does this happen?

The Windows registry consists of two parts: the volatile part (registry keys and values ​​that will be lost after the hive is disabled due to the fact that they are not saved to a file; example: the “CurrentControlSet” key of the SYSTEM hive), the non-volatile part (synchronized with registry hive file).

Since the integrity of the data being saved must be ensured when writing the non-volatile portion to a hive file (for example, in the event of a power failure that interrupts data write operations), the Windows kernel uses registry logging - the data being written is first saved to a log file (this file is located in the same directory as main file and has the extension “.LOG”, “.LOG1” or “.LOG2”) and only then to the main file of the hive (if writing to the log file is not completed successfully, then the main file will remain intact and untouched, and if writing to If the main file does not complete successfully, its integrity can be restored using log data that was successfully written before the failure).

The suggested way to hide keys (and their values, as well as other elements) is to save the corresponding data only to the log, and not to the main registry hive file. Third-party programs that work with an inactive registry will overwhelmingly ignore the log file(s), and therefore registry keys stored in the log, but not in the main file, will be invisible to these programs. The Windows kernel, on the other hand, uses the log to restore the integrity of the hive when it is mounted, and therefore the keys discussed will be visible to the kernel and, accordingly, other running programs.

To block writes to the main hive file, you can use the debugging mechanism that appeared in Windows Vista. To understand the essence of this mechanism, it is necessary to consider the logging scheme that appeared in Windows Vista.

Logging before Windows Vista

On Windows XP and earlier Windows versions Each non-volatile registry hive corresponds to one main file and one log file. The exception to this rule is the SYSTEM hive in Windows 2000 and earlier versions of Windows, which is mirrored (to a file named "system.alt") rather than logged to simplify the bootloader code (which must load the specified hive into memory) and not add it supports recovery from the log (mirroring means alternately writing data to two main files, which as a result will have the same logical structure of keys, values ​​and other elements).

Journaling occurs by compactly (without offset alignment) saving to a log file the data to be written to the main file along with a structure - a bitmap of sectors of the main file, which allows you to determine at which offsets the data blocks from the log file need to be written to the main file. If, when connecting a hive, it is determined that data has not been completed written to its main file, then blocks will be read from the log file, the offsets of these blocks in the main file will be determined (using a bitmap), and then those blocks will be written to the main file. thus completing the previously interrupted recording due to failure.

This scheme has a significant drawback - if an I/O error occurs while writing to the main file (for example, due to an attempt to write to a bad sector), then further synchronization operations of the hive with the main file will be impossible until the computer is rebooted (even if if the bad sector will be neutralized by reassigning sectors at the driver level file system or storage facilities). This is due to the fact that logging clears the log file of old data each time, which means that an error in writing to the main file will lead to a violation of the integrity of this file, and a new attempt to synchronize the hive will require erasing the data from the log that remains the only way restore the already damaged integrity of the main file.

Therefore, if such log erasure is allowed, a situation may arise where a new failure causes the integrity of a single log file to be compromised, while the integrity of the main file was compromised by a previous failure.

Logging from Windows Vista (up to Windows 8.1)

To solve the problem of synchronizing the hive with the main file in the face of repeated failures, a double logging scheme was implemented. In this scheme, each main file corresponds to two log files (with the extensions “.LOG1” and “.LOG2”). By default, the first log file (".LOG1") is used.

If an error occurs while writing to the main file, the log file is changed (from “.LOG1” to “.LOG2” and vice versa). This approach ensures constant availability a valid log file that contains data from the previous synchronization attempt. As a result, a failure while writing to the log file (after a failure while writing to the main file) will not lead to an irreparable violation of the integrity of the registry hive (by the way, if such a situation does arise, the Windows kernel has self-healing mechanisms that correct obvious errors in logical structure bush).

But this logging scheme needs to be debugged, and therefore a variable was introduced into the Windows kernel that allows you to simulate repeated write errors to the main files of all registry hives - CmpFailPrimarySave. For unknown reasons, this variable is also present in regular versions of the kernel (and not just in debug versions). If you write some value other than zero to this variable, then the function of writing data to the main file will simulate an error at different stages of such writing.

It should be noted that during the registry hive mounting process, the kernel must select which of the two log files to use for recovery, which implements a relatively complex algorithm to determine which of the log files has retained integrity, which of them contains a more recent version of the data being written, etc. e. Before Windows 8, this algorithm contained a serious bug that resulted in the first log file (".LOG1") being selected in almost all cases, regardless of the specific details. In particular, for Windows 7, the corresponding algorithm fixes were released only in March 2016 (hence, during this time, double logging in Windows 7 provided no better integrity protection than Windows XP). To overcome the described error, it is necessary not only to block writing to the main hive file, but also to block the transition to the second log file (“.LOG2”) in case of failure (so that the first log file always contains the most recent data, even at the expense of integrity in the event failure; otherwise, at the next boot, the system registry hives may be restored to a state unexpectedly earlier than when the computer was shut down). Fortunately, the following value of the variable in question allows us to achieve the desired effect without changing the log file - 3.

This same variable will work the same in newer versions of Windows (8.1 and 10) that use a different logging method (outside the scope of this article).

Experiment

As an experiment, let's create an invisible key and its value in the operating room Windows system 7 (Service Pack 1). To do this, in a running operating system, change (by editing memory) the value of the kernel variable CmpFailPrimarySave from 0 to 3, and then create a registry key “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\invisible_key” with a value called “invisible_value” containing the string “123456”. Then we turn off the operating system in the normal way and export the files of the SYSTEM registry hive.

After turning on the operating system again, launch the registry editor and note that the key and value you are looking for are visible in it (Fig. 1).

Rice. 1: Windows Registry Editor

At the same time, in the exported registry files, the searched key and value third party programs(for example, Windows Registry Recovery and Registry Explorer) do not display (Fig. 2 and 3).

Rice. 2: Windows Registry Recovery

Rice. 3: Registry Explorer

Conclusion

You should not rely excessively on programs that work with an inactive registry during an information security incident investigation, as well as during integrity monitoring. This article demonstrated one of many ways to hide a registry key, its values ​​and other elements from such programs.

In accordance with PP 1119 dated November 1, 2012. 3 types of threats are introduced in one way or another related to the presence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in the software.

Let's consider measures aimed at neutralizing these threats for personal data operators who do not process information classified as state secrets.

So, we have two levels of threats:

1. Threats associated with the presence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in system software.

2. Threats associated with the presence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in application software.

Measures aimed at neutralizing threats are divided into four main components:

1.Measures aimed at preventing the emergence of a threat.

2.Measures aimed at identifying the threat.

3.Measures aimed at neutralizing identified threats.

4.Measures aimed at minimizing harm or the effectiveness of the threat.

Now we will evaluate the implementation of measures, but before that we will take into account several important conditions:

1. We are considering information systems (IS) that are built by PD operators. You need to understand that the overwhelming number of operators solve problems of creating IS only using standard products both at the system and application levels ( operating systems, office data processing systems, DBMS and software). Development of special information systems and technology is a rare occurrence. This is expensive and for the most part operators do not have such a task and cannot be solved with the available resources.

2.The operator receives software components IP in finished form - without design documentation, without source texts, etc. Only distribution kit and operational documentation. At the same time, it is important to understand that a significant part of operators do not build IS but only operate it.

3.The main methods for ensuring the safe use of software include:

• formation and control of compliance with requirements for the safe design, implementation and use of software at all stages life cycle BY;
• analysis of the software operating environment aimed at identifying characteristics that are considered dangerous or potentially dangerous;
• software analysis aimed at identifying functionality and characteristics that are considered hazardous or potentially hazardous;
• the use of methods and means aimed at ensuring the stability of the operating environment from the negative impact of software;
• control of the software operating environment (dynamic control of behavior, changes in characteristics, etc.) during the operation of the IS;
• control of software during its operation.

But these methods are hardly available to the operator.

Now let's try to build real measures that an operator can use to neutralize threats.

(Threat 1, measure 1) Preventing the emergence of threats is associated with the control of technologies for the safe development of system software. If we consider threats at this level, we generally get the following:

Sources of threats at the stage of forming requirements for system software

• formation of requirements aimed at creating conditions for subsequent unsafe use of software;
• miscalculations when forming software requirements.

Sources of threats at the system software design stage

• targeted introduction of a vulnerability or backdoor at the level of architecture and/or algorithm of software operation;
• targeted design of testing methods that are aimed at hiding vulnerabilities/backdoors;
• introduction of vulnerabilities/bookmarks using computer-aided software design tools;
• the use of architectural solutions that lead to the need to use resource-intensive methods for testing and debugging software.

Sources of threats at the stage of implementation (coding/compilation/assembly) of system software

• targeted introduction of bookmarks;
• targeted introduction of vulnerability;
• use of third-party untrusted components;
• hidden implementation of special settings that allow you to enable/initiate bookmarks or software vulnerabilities;
• excessive compilation and assembly of software from “dirty” source codes containing various “software garbage”;
• introduction of vulnerabilities using software compilation and assembly tools;
• implementation of tests that allow you to hide vulnerabilities and flaws in software.

Sources of threats at the stage of testing system software by a developer

• Conducting testing by the developer or customer of system software

Testing of system software by an independent laboratory during certification or other tests

• targeted use of testing methods that are aimed at hiding vulnerabilities;
• testing is not carried out or is carried out incompletely;
• deliberate concealment of test results.

Sources of threats at the stage of system software implementation

• replacement of system software components;
• implementation of system software without taking into account the limitations and operating conditions of both the software itself and its operating environment;
• usage hidden settings system software to enable/initiate bookmarks or vulnerabilities.

Taking into account the conditions stated above, it is obvious that the operator does not have the ability to control and ensure the absence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in the system software.
Conclusion: measures 1.1. – not available to the operator.

(Threat 1, measure 2) Measures aimed at identifying threats to the operator are available. To do this, the operator can independently or with the assistance of specialists:

• monitor various sources of information about identified vulnerabilities in the system software used;
• use self-monitoring tools built into the system software;
• use various security monitoring tools, including those developed in-house.

(Threat 1, measure 3) Taking into account the measures (Threat 1, measure 2), the operator can independently or with the involvement of specialists:

• install service packs and patches to neutralize identified vulnerabilities;
• apply additional information and protection tools to neutralize identified system software vulnerabilities;

(Threat 1, measure 4) the operator can independently or with the involvement of specialists take measures aimed at minimizing harm or the effectiveness of the implementation of vulnerabilities (both identified and not yet identified) of system software:

• when building an IS, provide for the possible presence of threats and formulate the IS architecture in such a way that the possible implementation of vulnerabilities causes minimal harm to the goals and objectives assigned to the IS. Architectural solutions include: localization and segmentation of the information system processing personal data, availability of periodic archiving tools, restriction of user access, control of information flows, control of external data carriers, depersonalization, minimization technical means involved in data processing, the use of system software integrity monitoring tools and information protection tools, the use of anti-virus tools, etc... you can’t list everything...
• apply additional information and protection systems to neutralize possible system software vulnerabilities;
• apply additional organizational and technical measures related to changes in the IS architecture, system software settings, etc.

We must assume that the maximum threats are: - data leaks, destruction of data and information resources of the information system, loss of control over the resources of the information system.

It is necessary to ensure that the maximum threat to IP remains: destruction of data and software, which is compensated by integrity control and system quick recovery IS performance.

Having examined the threats of the first type, we see that the same applies to application software.

General conclusions:

• operators are not able to apply measures aimed at preventing the emergence of threats associated with the presence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in the software.
• Operators for the most part do not have the ability to independently identify threats associated with the presence of undocumented (undeclared) capabilities in software.
• operators have the ability, independently or with the involvement of third-party specialists, to monitor identified vulnerabilities of system and application software and take measures aimed at neutralizing them, minimizing possible harm and/or the effectiveness of the implementation of vulnerabilities.
• operators have the opportunity to make architectural decisions when constructing and during operation of IS and information security subsystems aimed at minimizing possible harm and/or effectiveness of threats.
• operators have the capabilities independently or with the involvement of third-party specialists to ensure a continuous PROCESS aimed at...

Here I tried to compile a list of various additional features for the subscriber cellular communications MTS company - either functionally or in terms of cost savings. All information is obtained from the Internet; MTS service department either denies or ignores it. For this reason, and because all of these services are provided free of charge by third parties, I have grouped them under the heading “undocumented.” This means that you can use these features, but no one guarantees you that any of them services will continue to work, or that they will remain free and no fees will be charged for them. You place the entire risk of using undocumented functions and possible “getting money” on yourself.

Part 1. Mobile phone and Internet

Owners of GSM mobile phones have the ability to send and receive short text messages(SMS) to each other. But in MTS, as in Beeline, this can officially only be done within its subscriber network, that is, an MTS subscriber cannot send a message to a Beeline subscriber and vice versa. Officially, no, but unofficially, it may well be so. Moreover, it can receive and send messages via e-mail(e-mail) and ICQ using your phone.

International SMS service centers

A huge number of GSM operators in the world allow you to send SMS from their service center not only to their subscribers, but to everyone, including MTS subscribers. By registering the number of such a service center in your phone, you will be able to send SMS to any other GSM phone user. At one time, such SMS sending was free. Now – paid, at the usual rate of $0.12 (including VAT). The only limitation: you must have it activated international access, which is already included for all tariffs with the “International” prefix and is easily connected to subscribers of all other tariffs.

Why are international service centers needed? Firstly, according to responses from “ hotline“Western SMSCs operate more stable on average, i.e. the percentage of message delivery (not “buffering”) is higher. Secondly, some people are annoyed by the delivery notification that cannot be disabled. And thirdly, if the operator has a roaming agreement with MTS and Beeline, you can send SMS to a Beeline GSM phone.

Not all Western service centers work with Russia, but most of them do not care where the message comes from and where it needs to be sent. Below is a list of centers that work with SMS around the world.

Turkcell Turkey +90-5329010000
NetCom Norway +47-92001000
Sonera Finland +358-405202000
Mobilix Denmark +45-26265151
One2One UK +44-7958879879
Esat Ireland +353-868002000
E-Plus Germany +49-1770620000
Telfort The Netherlands +31-626000230
Proximus Belgium +32-75161612
PTT Luxembourg +352-021100003
North West Russia +7-8129600096
IDEA Centertel Poland +48-501200777
Radiomobil Czech rep +420-603051
Globtel Slovakia +421-905303303
Westel900 Hungary +36-309303100
TIM Italy +39-338980000
Swisscom Switzerland +41-89191
Itineris France +33-689004581
Sprint USA +1-7044100000

How to send an email from my phone?

Actually GSM standard Supports sending e-mail from your phone. However, this function does not work in MTS - either there is no appropriate equipment, or they cannot make the appropriate settings. Fortunately, there are independent sources on the Internet with a pretty good range of services that allow you to send e-mail directly from your phone.

eXcell (Italy) – send an SMS to phone +393388641732 with text like: EMAIL [email protected] body

Between the dots is a Subject, which you don’t have to write at all if you’re lazy - in this case you can do without the dots. Then the messages will look something like this:
EMAIL [email protected] Hello John!
The word EMAIL at the beginning of the message can be shortened to EMA, instead of @ you can type it! or *, and instead of _ you can type: (colon). Instead of the end of the line, you can type = or &.
Example:
EMA banzai*mail.ru.Alert From Provider.Vykhodi iz Ineta, zaraza! = Ne mogu do tebja dozvonitsja!!!

Your phone number will appear as a signature. You can customize any other signature ( detailed instructions– on the eXcell website. Remember that each letter sent this way will cost you 12 cents.

SgiC (Finns) – another SMS – e-mail gateway. For the lazy, briefly: send an SMS to the phone number +358 40 517 4761, the first word is the email address (you can use # instead of @). Then, separated by a space, write the actual message.

Examples:
[email protected] This is a test, whoa! (it’s the Finns who are so happy :)
evolving#oeoe.fi This is another test, hopla!*
Each letter sent this way will also cost you 12 cents.

Do you want an Email -> SMS gateway? Write them a letter. Best in English and to the address [email protected]. And on the Internet you can find them here, only there everything is in Finnish.

And further. To be more reliable, it is best to use Western SMS centers, for example, Turkcell. They deliver mail almost instantly.

How to send a message from your phone to ICQ?

Exactly the same as e-mail, with the only difference that the address will look like this: [email protected], where ICQ_number is your subscriber's ICQ identification number.

Example:
EMAIL 1111111@ pager.icq.com.email express message.Are you still alive?
A proven method: messages via Turkcell reach the Finnish e-mail gate the fastest.

How to receive email on your mobile phone?

SMS delivery via email works in test mode. Send an e-mail to [email protected] For direct number, [email protected] for “crooked”. It should be remembered that Russian letters are correctly transliterated if the letter is sent to WIN encoding, so to be sure, it’s better to write in Latin right away. “Testing” means that MTS does not guarantee you round-the-clock and trouble-free operation of this service. For each e-mail sent in this way, you receive a receipt for delivery or buffering of your SMS.

We also have one company that allows you to do this for free for now. You can register on this site and create your own Mailbox kind [email protected], and in the settings on the website write down your number mobile phone. From now on, all mail arriving at your address [email protected] will be sent as SMS to your phone. The limit is 160 characters, as with any SMS message. Attachments, of course, are not shown.

To use this opportunity in practice, you need to get yourself a mailbox that would allow you to simultaneously leave a message and forward it to your address on over.ru, and then you will receive notifications on your phone as soon as the mail arrives. If you consider the message important, but cannot read it (say, it turns out to be longer than 160 characters or there is a file attached), immediately, as soon as possible, go online and read the message in a normal human way.

How to send SMS from the Internet?

You can send it from the MTS server. But no one guarantees you anything (including money): “ test mode" The number must be written in international format, but without “+”, for example, 70957601234, 79026801234

Difference sending SMS from the MTS server from others in that he transliterates Russian letters into Latin and also fills in obscene words with asterisks. What words, you ask? I have them :) The dictionary of swear words was found by 2pac on mobile telecom, and most likely the same filter is on MTS, because This is also a handicraft by Mr. Lebedev (who designed the MTS server). Here he is

There is also an undocumented ability of the MTS server to send SMS in Russian to devices that support the Cyrillic alphabet. The algorithm is as follows: through the service center +70957699800, send a message to number 0 (zero) with the text “UCS2” (without quotes, of course). After this, messages from the MTS website can be sent directly in Russian. All this can be canceled by sending a message with the text “DEFAULT”.

There are also many places on the Internet from where you can send SMS to an MTS phone for free. Unfortunately, many of the well-known free SMS senders periodically do not work (or do not work for Moscow).

Pagergate 2.0 (Russia) – periodically does not work.
sms.pagergate.ru - for some reason it works better than PagerGate, although the same equipment is used.
Golden Telecom (Ukraine) - excellent service, it can send SMS in Russian to devices that support Cyrillic. MTS is temporarily not serviced for some reason.
German server - you need to register, after which you will be able to send SMS around the world in an international format.

Part 2. Free calls

It is known that in MTS the first 20 seconds of incoming calls and the first 5 seconds of outgoing calls are free, but this is official. How can you talk on a cell phone longer without spending extra money? And is this even possible?

How to call an MTS phone for free, including from the city?

It turns out it's possible. You just need to carefully, thoroughly, down to the last letter, study all the instructions that you received when buying a phone (remember the instructions for Soviet products, right down to the comb, the period of developed socialism “item 1. It is strictly forbidden to use the product until you read these instructions and strictly follow them ”?) It’s possible that the customer service team also doesn’t read its instructions carefully enough :)

It turns out that this is at the junction of two services: GP (voice mail) and SMS. The fact is that when a message arrives at your GP, it sends you an SMS notification. But you can record a message on the GP not only when forwarding, but also directly through the service 7661 “listening to messages voicemail”.

So, a little workshop. We dial 7661 - this, of course, is free. Let's listen to hint 8 - carefully, until the last sound. Yeah, to send a message we dial ** - that’s the key combination! Now everything is simple: for a direct number we dial 57601234, for a “crooked” number 26801234, listen to the greeting, say the message, press #. The second subscriber receives an SMS, dials 7661 - again free of charge, listens to the message.

It's even easier from the city. We dial 7661111, go to tone, then for direct 57601234, for “crooked” 26801234, listen to the greeting, say the message, hang up. An additional benefit from this method: dialing a “crooked” number without having to fiddle with the “eight”.

How to talk between two phones for free?

Well, if you can call from one phone to another for free, then what prohibits calling from the second to the first?

That is, this is a half-duplex mode: I tell you a message, you listen; you talk, I listen, and there is no need to break the connection with the GP: end of message #, exit to the main menu *. The only drawback: you have to listen to the greeting every time, but something must be wrong :) Besides, it’s free, and it’s worth the trouble.

Is it true that the above is really as described? I can't believe it. But the customer service answered me differently. What should I do?

First: if in doubt, it is better not to use it. These functions are only for determined and risk-taking people.

Second: regarding the service and reliability/unreliability, paid/free – carefully re-read the preface to the section again.

And finally, third. What should I do? Yes, very simple. Order a printout of calls one day in advance if you don't have a monthly one. It will cost you $0.24, in other words, about 7 rubles. “Pay and sleep well” (with) you know whose :)

P.S. MTS Service Desk message: GP does not connect to this moment nor to subscribers with federal numbers, nor to subscribers with direct Moscow numbers. Unfortunately, the Service Desk has no information about the prospect of starting to connect this service.

The article uses materials from the MTS website pages