The Yalta Conference of the Big Three took place this year. Yalta Conference: main decisions. Situation in the Balkans

Permyakov V.E. 1

Permyakova E.V. 1

1 Municipal budgetary educational institution “Secondary school No. 16 with in-depth study of individual subjects named after Vladimir Petrovich Shevalev”

The text of the work is posted without images and formulas.
Full version work is available in the "Work Files" tab in PDF format

Introduction

History is a lantern to the future,

which shines upon us from the past.

Vasily Osipovich Klyuchevsky.

There have been many different events in world history that have had a very powerful influence on its course in the future, and even on the situation in the world today. There are quite a lot of such events in history, but the most famous of them are the fall of the Western Roman Empire in 476, the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Great French Revolution of 1789-1799, and many, many other events and processes that took place in world history...

My work will be about one of the events that occurred precisely during the Second World War, and in which we took an active part. I would like to talk about the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945 and its role in the post-war world order. When writing this work, my main goal was the following: to determine the role of the Yalta (Crimean) Conference in the post-war world order.

Based on what goal I decided to set myself the following tasks:

Understand how the conference of the heads of the “Big Three” in Crimea was prepared and organized. Consider the main issues that needed to be resolved at the Yalta Conference.

Follow the progress of the Yalta Conference. Find out what the results of the conference were and the decisions made.

Determine the role of the Yalta Conference and its principles in post-war international relations.

To understand whether the Yalta-Potsdam principles of the world order are being protected and preserved today.

The object of my research was the documents and final agreements of the Yalta Conference, as well as its role in the triad: Tehran-Yalta-Potsdam.

During the research, I decided to test the following hypothesis: The principles of the post-war world order adopted in Yalta in 1945 saved humanity from global war for 70 years.

The relevance of this topic lies in the fact that at present in our world those principles of the world order that were adopted during the Yalta Conference have been practically destroyed. The growing threat of World War III, which will most likely put an end to the existence of mankind, clearly demonstrates that the Yalta principles were a powerful force holding the world back from global war for such a long period of time.

I would also like to add that today there is such a problem as the revival of fascism in some countries liberated from fascist invaders (Poland, Ukraine, Romania, the Baltic countries), and Russophobia is actively being promoted and developing.

In addition, the very right of “veto”, introduced precisely at the creation of the UN, is today used in two ways. Using it, the country that has this right can impose a ban on any decision made during a UN meeting only because it is very beneficial from a financial point of view for this country to ban this decision or measure.

1. Reasons for holding and preparation of the Yalta Conference

The Yalta Conference became the second multilateral meeting of the leaders of the three countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

The conference participants were located in three Crimean palaces: the USSR delegation headed by I.V. Stalin in the Yusupov Palace, the US delegation led by F. Roosevelt in the Livadia Palace and the British delegation led by W. Churchill in the Vorontsov Palace.

Another question arises: Why did you decide to hold the conference in Yalta? The thing is that it was somewhat symbolic. Yalta was the city that was recently liberated by Soviet troops. Hitler believed that after Crimea was conquered by German troops, it would remain German forever, i.e. Yalta would become the best resort in Germany. Thus, Soviet Yalta was a symbol of the liberation of people from the fascist yoke.

The USSR prepared to receive high-ranking guests in Yalta in just two months, despite the fact that Crimea was heavily damaged by military operations. US President Roosevelt was even “horrified by the extent of the destruction caused by the Germans in Crimea.”

2. Progress and decisions of the conference

So, based on the fact that the conference covered a large number of important issues that were then on the agenda, and on the solution of which depended what the world would be like, and whether the world would exist at all.

The following took part in the conference:

Leaders of the three allied powers: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill, President of the United States of America F.D. Roosevelt. The range of military and political issues discussed turned out to be quite wide.

The main ones were:

The question of reparations

The question of the post-war fate of Germany

The question of the post-war situation in Poland and Yugoslavia.

The question of the war between the USSR and Japan

The question of the post-war world order

This letter was translated orally by A.A. Gromyko, and at the end of his translation aloud, Stalin said: “The letter is important, America has now recognized the validity of our position on the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. The Americans will probably insist on their position on the issue of the possibility of the Soviet Union participating in the war against Japan ...". [No. 2. P.15]

Stalin ended this topic of conversation with the words: “By taking the position the United States has now taken, it is as if they are rehabilitating themselves in our eyes for the fact that they sympathized with Japan in 1905.” Then, in Portsmouth, after the Russo-Japanese War, peace negotiations were held between the Japanese delegation and the Russian delegation, headed by the head of government, Count Witte. At that time, the United States essentially helped Japan tear its territories away from Russia.

Thus, the question of the USSR's entry into the war in the Far East was resolved. The secret agreement signed on February 11, 1945 stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two to three months after the surrender of Germany.

According to the terms of the agreement “On the Zones of Occupation of Germany and on the Administration of Greater Berlin,” the armed forces of the three powers were to occupy strictly defined zones during the occupation of Germany. The eastern part of Germany was intended for the Soviet Armed Forces to occupy. The northwestern part of Germany was allocated for occupation by British troops, the southwestern part by American troops. There were also “interesting” scenarios for the future of Germany. “If it has any future,” said W. Churchill at the meeting on February 4. The Prime Minister of Great Britain proposed separating its southern provinces from Germany, including Bavaria, and including them in the Danube Federation...” F.D. Roosevelt made a proposal to divide Germany into five independent states. Exotic ideas were received from the allies a lot. In response to W. Churchill’s statement that communism was suitable for Germany as a future type of government, J.V. Stalin was even forced to note that communism fits Germany “like a saddle for a cow.” So its division does not look at all random.

The key problem, therefore, remained the German one. The conference participants signed a statement that, in particular, said: “Our unyielding goal is the destruction of German militarism and Nazism and the creation of guarantees that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the whole world,” that “Germany will never again will be able to disrupt the peace", "disarm and disband all German armed forces and destroy the German General Staff forever", "seize or destroy all German military equipment, liquidate or take control of all German industry that could be used for war production; subject all war criminals to fair and speedy punishment...; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions from the face of the earth; eliminate all Nazi and militaristic influence from public institutions, from the cultural and economic life of the German people

The issue of reparations to Germany, initiated by the USSR, occupied a special place at the conference. The Soviet government demanded that Germany compensate for the damage caused to the allied countries by Hitler's aggression. The total amount of reparations was supposed to be 20 billion dollars, of which the USSR claimed 10 billion dollars. The collection of reparations through a one-time withdrawal from national wealth (equipment, machines, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, etc.) was envisaged mainly for the purpose of destroying Germany's military potential. During the discussion of this issue, the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were forced to admit that the Soviet proposals for reparations from Germany were quite fair. As a result of the negotiations, a protocol was signed, published in full only in 1947. It outlined the general principles for resolving the reparations issue and outlined the forms of collecting reparations from Germany. The Soviet delegation (reported by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs I.M. Maisky, Chairman of the Reparations Commission, J.V. Stalin allowed him to speak in English) named the amount of 20 billion dollars. This was the smallest insignificant share of compensation for direct material losses of the USSR during the German occupation of the territories of the USSR and military operations. The damage to the Soviet Union was estimated by experts and economists at 2 trillion. 600 billion rubles. Western leaders verbally acknowledged the enormous damage suffered by the USSR, but in practice they were unwilling to do anything real to help the Soviet Union receive reparations. However, the Allies were never able to finally determine the amount of compensation. It was only decided that the United States and Great Britain would give Moscow 50% of all reparations.

Thinking only about how not to weaken post-war Germany and maintain its role as a “stronghold against Bolshevism,” W.S. Churchill, under various pretexts, refused to record in the protocol the exact amount of German reparations proposed by the Soviet delegation. F.D. Roosevelt, although he could have, did not “twist the arms” of his British partner, and for good reason.[№5.С. 246]

It is noteworthy that at the conference itself the US delegation did not touch upon the issue of a long-term loan of $6 billion, although such a proposal came from the Soviet side in response to vague American hints. An important place among the decisions of the Crimean Conference was occupied by the Declaration of a Liberated Europe. It was a document on policy coordination in helping peoples liberated from fascist occupation. The Allied Powers declared that the general principle of their policy towards the countries of liberated Europe was the establishment of an order which would enable the peoples "to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to establish democratic institutions of their own choice." The Crimean Conference showed an example of the practical resolution of similar problems in relation to Poland and Yugoslavia.

The USSR received the western border with Poland in 1920, with a retreat from it in some areas of 5 to 8 km in favor of Poland. In fact, the border returned to the position at the time of the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR in 1939 under the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany, the main difference from which was the transfer of the Bialystok region to Poland.[No. 5.P.301]

In Yalta, the implementation of the idea of a new League of Nations began. The Allies needed an interstate organization capable of preventing attempts to change the established boundaries of their spheres of influence. It was agreed that the UN's activities in resolving fundamental issues of ensuring peace would be based on the principle of unanimity of the great powers - permanent members of the Security Council with the right of veto.

I.V. Stalin managed to convince F.D. Roosevelt that the lack of veto power in certain conditions could turn against American interests and repeat the situation with the Charter of the League of Nations, which Congress had once rejected. Thus, I.V. Stalin achieved the agreement of his partners that among the founders and members of the UN would be not only the USSR, but also the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR. And it was in the Yalta documents that the date “April 25, 1945” appeared - the date of the beginning of the San Francisco Conference, which was intended to develop the UN Charter. [No.1.P.47]

3. The significance of the Yalta Conference for the post-war world order and history

During the conference, the Heads of the three powers demonstrated a desire for cooperation, mutual understanding and trust. It was possible to achieve unity on issues of military strategy and the conduct of a coalition war. Powerful strikes by the Allied armies in Europe and the Far East were jointly agreed upon and planned.

As a result of the conference, the most important international legal documents were approved, such as the Declaration of Free Europe, documents on the basic principles of the creation of the international United Nations Organization.

A global conflict may not necessarily be nuclear. This could be a conflict reminiscent of the Thirty Years' War in the 17th century, which was the de facto First World War. It was a series of local conflicts, separated in space and time, covering almost all of Europe. Now we see hotbeds of local wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. We may still have such outbreaks in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, we may end up with a serious conflict zone along the perimeter of our borders. Of course, the collective West is trying in this way to destabilize the situation in Russia and bring the regime they need to power. In case of victory, they hope to openly and officially, unlike the times of the collapse of the USSR, impose their will on the vanquished.[№7.С.4]

Unlike the times of the USSR, Russia now does not have the opportunity to “play on enemy territory.” The only thing that can be seriously used is the civilizational crisis in the USA and, especially, in Western Europe. European civilization is losing its racial identity, religious identity. Europeans work less and less and consume more. The work ethic gives way to the ethic of the pursuit of pleasure. Similar trends, although to a lesser extent, can be traced in the United States. Demographically, in both the New and Old Worlds, the indigenous population is being replaced by newcomers. Our task is not to fall into this funnel of self-destruction together with the West. Perhaps, in these historical conditions, victory will not consist in winning, but in waiting for the enemy to disappear, as it were.

Politically, many decisions of the Yalta Conference are not respected today. For example, as a result of this conference, Germany was to be completely cleared of Nazism. She was prohibited from any assistance in instilling Nazism in other states. But what do we see? Today Germany supports the Kiev regime, despite the fact that it turns a blind eye to Russophobia, anti-Semitism and other Nazi manifestations. And sometimes he even supports ultranationalists and uses them in his own interests. I have a feeling that Germany’s support for current Ukraine contradicts the Yalta agreements. [No. 3.P.431]

Of course, the degradation of the world order that emerged as a result of the Yalta Conference was mainly due to the collapse of the USSR. But this was also superimposed on the spiritual crisis of Western civilization itself. Today, this is increasingly noticeable. It has gotten to the point that passengers on planes flying from Europe to Islamic states are being asked to remove their crosses. The world has become different.

Conclusion

The decisions reached in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference, the principles that were created at it, absolutely radically changed the very picture of the world and changed its future. To some extent, we can say that the Yalta conference in 1945 simply changed the world in its essence. I would like to note that historical science today has most successfully studied the following problems: the formation of the principles of the post-war system during the Yalta Conference, the implementation of these principles, the historical importance and value of the Crimean Conference.

I believe that the goal of my work has been achieved, the tasks have been completed, and the hypothesis is generally correct - the principles of the post-war world order adopted in Yalta in 1945 saved humanity from global war for 70 years. Why is the problem of the post-war world order, the foundations of which were laid during the Yalta Conference, so relevant? Today, even in the UN, in the very organization that is called upon to preserve peace at any humane cost, speeches are made with threats against various countries, threats to send troops into the territory of a particular country in order to “establish order.” But to establish order that will be beneficial only to those who establish it. And there are many such examples: Kosovo, conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan. But what next? Is it possible to bring back those principles, is it possible to hope that in the future the world will still be saved from a global war, humanity will still survive? Probably a clear answer to this moment humanity cannot give. We can only hope and believe that one fine day people will remember that the same Yalta principles of world order, which have already become history, which have coped excellently for 70 (!) years with the problem of protecting the world from global war, are still quite applicable to the fight against war and terrorism today.

List of sources and literature

Sources:

A.A. Gromyko, I.N. Zemskov, V.A. Kryuchkov and others - “The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: Collection of documents”, 1984.

The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: Collection of documents. In 6 volumes / Foreign Ministry. affairs of the USSR. T. 2. Tehran Conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (November 28 - December 1, 1943); T. 4. Crimean conference of the leaders of the three allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (February 4-11, 1945). M.: Politizdat, 1984.

Literature:

Balashov A.I., Rudakov G.P. History of the Great Patriotic War / A. I. Balashov, G. P. Rudakov. - St. - Petersburg: Peter, 2006.

Gurkovich V. Crimean Conference of 1945. Memorable places / V. Gurkovich.-M.: Mysl, 1995.

Zuev M.N. History of Russia: Textbook for universities. - M.: PRIOR Publishing House, 2009.

Shevchenko O.K. The Yalta Conference in the mirror of historiography: on the question of the application of quantitative methods in history.-Simferopol, .2010

Internet resources:

Berets S. Yalta. System of the Universe: (Russian BBC Service) [Electronic resource] / Sergey Berets. - Date of publication: 2005.02.04. - Article access mode: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/russian/news/newsid_4234000/4234225.stm

Butakov Y. Spirits of Yalta: changing options for globalization To the 60th anniversary of the Crimean Conference of the “Big Three”: (Political News Agency) [Electronic resource] / Yaroslav Butakov. - Date of publication: 2005.02.04. - Article access mode: http://www.apn.ru/opinions/article9230.htm

On February 4, 1945, near Yalta, the Crimean Conference opened in the Livadia Palace (Black Sea Observer newspaper) [Electronic resource]. - Publication date 2012.02.04. - Article access mode: http://yalta.tv/news/452---4--1945-------.html

Eggert K. Triumph and collapse of the Yalta system: (Russian BBC Service) [Electronic resource] / Konstantin Eggert. - Date of publication: 2005.02.11. - Article access mode: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/russian/in_depth/newsid_4255000/4255969.stm

The Crimean (Yalta) Conference, the second meeting of the leaders of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain - during the Second World War (1939-1945), occupies an important chapter in the history of not only our country, but the whole world. Interest in it does not wane, although 70 years have passed since it was held.

The location of the conference was not immediately chosen. Initially it was proposed to hold the meeting in Great Britain, as it was equidistant from the USSR and the USA. Among the names of the proposed venues were also Malta, Athens, Cairo, Rome and a number of other cities. I.V. Stalin insisted on holding the meeting in the Soviet Union so that the heads of delegations and their entourage could personally see the damage that Germany caused to the USSR.

The conference was held in Yalta on February 4-11, 1945 at a time when, as a result of successfully carried out strategic operations of the Red Army, military operations were transferred to German territory, and the war against Nazi Germany entered its final stage.

In addition to the official name, the conference had several codes. Going to the Yalta Conference, W. Churchill gave it the name “Argonaut”, drawing an analogy with ancient Greek myths: he, Stalin and Roosevelt, like the Argonauts, set off to the Black Sea shores for the Golden Fleece. Roosevelt responded to London with agreement: “You and I are the direct heirs of the Argonauts.” As you know, it was at the Yalta Conference that the division of spheres of influence of the three powers in the post-war world took place. The conference was codenamed “Island” to mislead opponents, since Malta was one of the possible venues for its holding.

The Conference was attended by the leaders of the three allied powers: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, Prime Minister of Great Britain W. Churchill, President of the United States of America F.D. Roosevelt.

In addition to the Heads of the Three Governments, members of delegations also participated in the Conference. From the Soviet Union - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov, People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky and I.M. Maisky, Air Marshal S.A. Khudyakov, Ambassador to Great Britain F.T. Gusev, Ambassador to the USA A.A. Gromyko. From the United States of America - Secretary of State E. Stettinius, Chief of Staff to the President Fleet Admiral W. Lehey, Special Assistant to the President G. Hopkins, Director of the Department of Military Mobilization Judge J. Byrnes, Chief of Staff of the US Army General of the Army J. Marshall, Commander in Chief of the Navy US forces Fleet Admiral E. King, Chief of Supply of the American Army Lieutenant General B. Somervell, Administrator of Naval Transport Vice Admiral E. Land, Major General L. Cooter, Ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman, Director of the European Department of State Department F. Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the State Department A. Hiss, Assistant Secretary of State Charles Bohlen, along with political, military and technical advisers. From Great Britain - Foreign Secretary A. Eden, Minister of Military Transport Lord Leathers, Ambassador to the USSR A. Kerr, Deputy Foreign Minister A. Cadogan, Secretary of the War Cabinet E. Bridges, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal A. Brooke, Chief of the Air Staff Forces Air Marshal C. Portal, First Sea Lord Fleet Admiral E. Cunningham, Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Defense General H. Ismay, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater Field Marshal Alexander, Chief of the British Military Mission in Washington Field Marshal Wilson, Member of the British Military Mission in Washington Admiral Somerville, along with military and diplomatic advisers.

The USSR prepared to receive high-ranking guests in Yalta in just two months, despite the fact that Crimea was heavily damaged by military operations. Destroyed houses and the remains of military equipment made an indelible impression on all conference participants; US President Roosevelt was even “horrified by the extent of the destruction caused by the Germans in Crimea.”

Preparations for the conference were launched on an all-Union scale. Equipment, furniture, and food were brought to Crimea from all over the USSR, and specialists from construction organizations and the service sector arrived in Yalta. In Livadia, Koreiz and Alupka, several power plants were installed in two months.

Sevastopol was chosen as the site for the allied ships and vessels, where reserves of fuel, drinking and boiler water were created, berths, lighthouses, navigation and anti-submarine equipment were repaired, additional trawling was carried out in bays and along the fairway, and a sufficient number of tugboats were prepared. Similar work was carried out in the Yalta port.

The host party was responsible for the safety of conference participants. Security on land was provided by aviation and artillery special groups, from the sea - by the cruiser Voroshilov, destroyers, and submarines. In addition, Allied warships joined them. Since Crimea was still within the range of German aircraft based in Northern Italy and Austria, an air attack was not ruled out. In order to repel the danger, 160 fleet aviation fighters and the entire air defense were allocated. Several air-raid shelters were also built.

Four regiments of NKVD troops were sent to Crimea, including 500 officers and 1,200 operational workers specially trained for security duties. Overnight, the park around the Livadia Palace was surrounded by a four-meter fence. Service personnel were prohibited from leaving the palace grounds. A strict access regime was introduced, according to which two rings of security were installed around the palaces, and with the onset of darkness a third ring of border guards with service dogs was organized. Communication centers were established in all palaces to ensure communication with any subscriber, and employees who spoke English were assigned to all stations.

Official meetings of members of delegations and informal ones - dinners of heads of state - were held in all three palaces: in Yusupovsky, for example, I.V. Stalin and W. Churchill discussed the issue of transferring people liberated from fascist camps. Foreign ministers met at the Vorontsov Palace: Molotov, Stettinius (USA) and Eden (Great Britain). But the main meetings took place at the Livadia Palace, the residence of the American delegation, despite the fact that this was contrary to diplomatic protocol. This was due to the fact that F. Roosevelt could not move independently without assistance. From February 4 to February 11, 1945, eight official meetings took place at the Livadia Palace.

The range of military and political issues discussed turned out to be very wide. The decisions that were made at the conference had a great influence on accelerating the end of the war and the post-war structure of the world.

At the same time, the decisions made by the conference participants on the most complex issues of world politics, which were the result of compromises and mutual concessions, largely determined the development of international political events for a long time. Favorable opportunities were created for the effective operation of the post-war system of international relations, based on the principles of balance of interests, reciprocity, equality and cooperation, in order to ensure universal peace and security.

The terms of the Allies' treatment of defeated Germany were worked out and questions about its future were resolved. The conference participants declared their unshakable determination to eliminate German militarism and Nazism, agreed on France's participation in resolving the German problem, on the borders of Poland and the composition of its government, and on the conditions for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan. The enormous growth in the international authority of the Soviet Union, which was facilitated by the outstanding victories of the Soviet Armed Forces, played an important role in the course and results of the negotiations.

However, there were serious disagreements between the conference participants on a number of issues. Representatives of the Western countries that were members of the anti-Hitler coalition had concerns related to the transformation of the USSR into a global power. However, the persistent desire of Soviet diplomacy to search for mutually acceptable solutions and adopt them on the basis of equality without imposing its opinion on others led to the fact that the documents approved at the conference were a reflection of the consent of its participants, and not the result of Soviet dictate.

The work of the Conference began with a consideration of the situation on the European fronts. The heads of government of the three powers instructed the military headquarters to discuss at their meetings the issues of coordinating the offensive of the allied armies from the east and west. During meetings on military issues, it was confirmed that on February 8, 1945, the Soviet offensive would begin on the western front. However, American and British military experts refused to comply with Soviet requests to prevent the transfer of German troops from Norway and Italy to the Soviet-German front. In general terms, the interaction of strategic aviation forces was outlined. The coordination of relevant operations was entrusted to the General Staff of the Soviet Army and the heads of the allied military missions in Moscow.

During the Conference, the issue of the USSR's entry into the war in the Far East was resolved. The secret agreement signed on February 11, 1945 stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan two to three months after the surrender of Germany. In this regard, the conditions for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan were agreed upon, which were put forward by I.V. Stalin: maintaining the status quo of the Mongolian People's Republic; the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of Sakhalin and all adjacent islands; internationalization of Dairen (Dalian) and restoration of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval lease USSR base; resumption of joint cooperation with China (ensuring preferential significant interests of the Soviet Union) operation of the East China and South Manchurian Railways; transfer of the Kuril Islands to the USSR.

This agreement concretized the general principles of allied policy, which were recorded in the Cairo Declaration, signed by the United States, England and China and published on December 1, 1943.

Since the prospect of the USSR entering the war with Japan implied its defeat in the near future, this political agreement determined the boundaries of the possible advance of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East.

The leaders of the three great powers discussed the political issues that were to arise after the defeat of Germany. They agreed on plans to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender and general principles for the treatment of a defeated Germany. Allied plans provided, first of all, for the division of Germany into occupation zones. The conference confirmed the agreements developed by the European Advisory Commission “On the zones of occupation of Germany and on the management of Greater Berlin,” as well as “On the control mechanism in Germany.”

The agreement “On the control mechanism in Germany”, signed on November 14, 1944, stated that supreme power in Germany during the period of its fulfillment of the basic requirements of unconditional surrender would be exercised by the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA and England, each in its own zone of occupation according to instructions their governments. On matters affecting Germany as a whole, the Commanders-in-Chief would act jointly as members of the Supreme Control Authority, which would henceforth become known as the Control Council for Germany. Expanding these resolutions, the Crimean Conference decided to grant a zone in Germany also to France at the expense of the British and American occupation zones and invite the French government to join as a member of the Control Council for Germany.

When discussing the German question at the Crimean Conference, the leaders of the United States and Great Britain insisted on making a decision to create a commission to study the issue of the post-war structure of Germany and the possibility of its dismemberment. However, the Anglo-American plans for the dismemberment of Germany did not receive the approval of the Soviet delegation.

The Soviet Union's point of view on the future of Germany was well known from the very beginning of the war from the speeches of Soviet leaders. The USSR rejected the policy of revenge, national humiliation and oppression. At the same time, the leaders of the three powers declared their determination to implement important measures in relation to defeated Germany: to disarm and disband all German armed forces; destroy the German general staff; determine the punishment for Hitler's war criminals; destroy the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions.

The collection of reparations through a one-time withdrawal from national wealth (equipment, machines, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, etc.) was envisaged mainly for the purpose of destroying Germany's military potential. The conference took into account the experience of resolving the reparation problem after the First World War, when Germany was required to compensate for damages in currency and when the reparation issue ultimately contributed not to weakening, but to strengthening Germany's military potential.

During the discussion of this issue, the leaders of the United States and Great Britain were forced to admit the validity of Soviet proposals for reparations from Germany. As a result of the negotiations, a protocol was signed, published in full only in 1947. It outlined the general principles for resolving the reparations issue and outlined the forms of collecting reparations from Germany. The protocol provided for the establishment in Moscow of an inter-union commission on reparations consisting of representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. The protocol indicated that the Soviet and American delegations agreed to base their work on the Soviet government’s proposal on the total amount of reparations and on allocating 50 percent of it for the USSR.

Thus, despite the differences, the Allied powers made agreed decisions at the Crimean Conference not only on the complete defeat of Germany, but also on a common policy on the German question after the end of the war.

An important place among the decisions of the Crimean Conference was occupied by the Declaration of a Liberated Europe. It was a document on policy coordination in helping peoples liberated from fascist occupation. The Allied Powers declared that the general principle of their policy towards the countries of liberated Europe was the establishment of an order which would enable the peoples "to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to establish democratic institutions of their own choice." The Crimean Conference showed an example of the practical resolution of such problems in relation to two countries - Poland and Yugoslavia.

The “Polish question” at the conference was one of the most complex and controversial. The Crimean Conference was supposed to resolve the issue of the eastern and western borders of Poland, as well as the composition of the future Polish government.

Poland, which before the war was the largest country in Central Europe, sharply shrank and moved to the west and north. Until 1939, its eastern border passed almost under Kiev and Minsk. The western border with Germany was located east of the river. Oder, while most of the Baltic coast also belonged to Germany. In the east of the pre-war historical territory of Poland, the Poles were a national minority among Ukrainians and Belarusians, while part of the territories in the west and north inhabited by Poles was under German jurisdiction.

The USSR received the western border with Poland along the “Curzon Line”, established in 1920, with a deviation from it in some areas of 5 to 8 km in favor of Poland. In fact, the border returned to the position at the time of the division of Poland between Germany and the USSR in 1939 under the Treaty of Friendship and Border between the USSR and Germany, the main difference from which was the transfer of the Bialystok region to Poland.

Although Poland by the beginning of February 1945, as a result of the offensive of Soviet troops, was already under the rule of a provisional government in Warsaw, recognized by the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia (Edward Benes), there was a Polish government in exile in London (Prime Minister Tomasz Archiszewski), which did not recognize the decision of the Tehran Conference on the Curzon line and therefore could not, in the opinion of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, lay claim to power in the country after the end of the war. The instructions of the government in exile for the Home Army, developed on October 1, 1943, contained following instructions in the event of an unauthorized entry by the Polish government of Soviet troops into the pre-war territory of Poland: “The Polish government sends a protest to the United Nations against the violation of Polish sovereignty - due to the entry of the Soviets into Polish territory without the consent of the Polish government - at the same time declaring that the country will not interact with the Soviets. The government simultaneously warns that in the event of the arrest of representatives of the underground movement and any reprisals against Polish citizens, the underground organizations will switch to self-defense.”

The allies in Crimea realized that “a new situation was created in Poland as a result of its complete liberation by the Red Army.” As a result of a long discussion of the Polish issue, a compromise agreement was reached, according to which a new government of Poland was created - the “Provisional Government of National Unity”, on the basis of the Provisional Government of the Polish Republic “with the inclusion of democratic figures from Poland itself and Poles from abroad.” This decision, implemented in the presence of Soviet troops, allowed the USSR to subsequently form a political regime in Warsaw that suited it, as a result of which clashes between pro-Western and pro-communist formations in this country were resolved in favor of the latter.

The agreement reached in Yalta on the Polish issue was undoubtedly a definite step towards resolving one of the most controversial issues of the post-war world order. The conference did not accept the Anglo-American plan to replace the Polish Provisional Government with some new government. From the decisions of the conference it became clear that the core of the future Government of National Unity should be the existing Provisional Government.

At the proposal of the USSR, the Crimean Conference discussed the issue of Yugoslavia. The point was to speed up the formation of a unified Yugoslav government on the basis of an agreement concluded in November 1944 between the chairman of the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia, I. Tito, and the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav exile government in London, I. Subasic. According to this agreement, the new Yugoslav government was to be formed from the leaders of the national liberation movement with the participation of several representatives of the exile Yugoslav government. But the latter, with the support of the British government, slowed down the implementation of the agreement.

Having discussed the Yugoslav question, the conference accepted the USSR proposal with amendments from the British delegation. This decision was a great political support for the national liberation movement of Yugoslavia.

The problem of ensuring international security in the post-war years occupied an important place in the work of the Crimean Conference. The decision of the three allied powers to create a general international organization to maintain peace was of great importance.

The leaders of the three powers managed in Yalta to resolve the important issue of the voting procedure in the Security Council, on which no agreement was reached at the Dumbarton Oaks conference. As a result, the “veto principle” proposed by Roosevelt was adopted, that is, the rule of unanimity of the great powers when voting in the Security Council on issues of peace and security.

The leaders of the three Allied powers agreed to convene a United Nations conference in San Francisco on April 25, 1945, to prepare a charter for an international security organization. The conference was intended to invite countries that signed the United Nations Declaration on January 1, 1942, and those countries that declared war on the common enemy by March 1, 1945.

During the Crimean Conference, a special declaration was adopted: “Unity in organizing peace, as well as in waging war.” It indicated that the states represented at Yalta reaffirmed their determination to preserve and strengthen in the coming period of peace that unity of action that made victory in the war possible and certain for the United Nations. This was a solemn commitment by the three great powers to preserve in the future the principles of the powerful anti-fascist coalition that emerged during the Second World War. One manifestation of this determination was the agreement to establish a permanent mechanism for regular consultation between the three foreign ministers. This mechanism was called the “Conference of Foreign Ministers”. The conference decided that ministers would meet every 3-4 months alternately in the capitals of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA.

The Crimean conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA and Great Britain was of great historical significance. It was one of the largest international meetings during the war and the highest point of cooperation between the three Allied powers in waging war against a common enemy. The adoption by the Crimean Conference of agreed decisions on important issues serves as convincing proof of the possibility and effectiveness of international cooperation between states with different social systems. Given the presence of good will, the Allied powers, even in conditions of acute disagreement, were able to reach agreements imbued with the spirit of unity.

Thus, the decisions of the Crimean Conference strengthened the anti-fascist coalition at the final stage of the war and contributed to the achievement of victory over Germany. The struggle for the comprehensive and complete implementation of these decisions became one of the main tasks of Soviet foreign policy not only at the end of the war, but also in the post-war years. And although the Yalta decisions were strictly carried out only by the Soviet Union, they were, nevertheless, an example of the military cooperation of the “Big Three” during the war.

All the work of the Crimean Conference took place under the sign of the immeasurably increased international authority of the Soviet Union. The results of the work of the heads of the three allied governments served as the basis for those democratic, peace-loving principles of the post-war structure of Europe, which were developed by the Potsdam Conference, shortly after the victory over Nazi Germany. The bipolar world created in Yalta and the division of Europe into East and West survived for more than 40 years, until the end of the 1980s.

Prokhorovskaya A.I.
senior researcher of the 3rd department of the Scientific Research
Institute (military history) of the Military Academy
General Staff of the RF Armed Forces
Candidate of Historical Sciences

Preparations for the Yalta Conference, which lasted from February 4 to 11, 1945, began at the end of 1944. Not only the leaders of the anti-Hitler “Big Three” took part in it (the preparation), but also their closest advisers, assistants, and foreign ministers. Among the main participants on our side we can name, naturally, Stalin himself, Molotov, as well as Vyshinsky, Maisky, Gromyko, Berezhkov. The latter, by the way, left very interesting memoirs, which were published during his lifetime and were republished after his death.

Thus, by the time all three participants in the anti-Hitler coalition gathered in Yalta, the agenda had already been agreed upon and some positions had been clarified. That is, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt arrived in Crimea with an understanding of which issues their positions more or less coincided with, and which they still had to argue about.

The location of the conference was not immediately chosen. Initially it was proposed to hold the meeting in Malta. Even the following expression appeared: “from Malta to Yalta”. But ultimately, Stalin, citing the need to be in the country, insisted on Yalta. Hand on heart, we must admit that the “father of nations” was afraid to fly. History has not preserved a single flight of Stalin on an airplane.

Among the issues that were subject to discussion in Yalta, there were three main ones. Although, without a doubt, the conference touched upon a much wider range of problems, and agreements were reached on many positions. But the main ones, of course, were: the UN, Poland and Germany. These three issues took up most of the Big Three's time. And, in principle, agreements were reached on them, although, frankly speaking, with great difficulties (especially regarding Poland).

Diplomats during the Yalta Conference. (pinterest.com)

Regarding Greece, we had no objections - influence remained with Great Britain, but regarding Poland, Stalin was stubborn: he did not want to give it up, citing the fact that the country borders the USSR and it was through it that the war came to us (and not for the first time, By the way, in history we were threatened from there). Therefore, Stalin had a very firm position. However, despite Churchill’s categorical resistance and reluctance to cooperate, the Soviet leader achieved his goal.

What other options did the Allies have regarding Poland? In those days there (in Poland) there were two governments: Lublin and Mikolajczyk in London. Churchill, naturally, insisted on the latter and tried to win Roosevelt over to his side. But the American president made it very clear to the British prime minister that he did not intend to spoil relations with Stalin on this issue. Why? The explanation was simple: there was still a war with Japan, which was not of particular interest to Churchill, and Roosevelt did not want to argue with the Soviet leader in anticipation of a future alliance to defeat Japan.

As already mentioned, preparations for the conference began at the end of 1944, almost immediately after the opening of the Second Front. The war was drawing to a close, and it was clear to everyone that Hitler's Germany would not last long. Consequently, it was necessary to resolve, firstly, the issue of the future and, secondly, to divide Germany. Of course, after Yalta there was also Potsdam, but it was in Crimea that the idea arose (it belonged to Stalin) to give the zone to France (for which, we note, de Gaulle was always grateful to the USSR).

Also in Livadia, a decision was made to grant UN membership to Belarus and Ukraine. At first the conversation was about all the republics of the USSR, Stalin gently insisted on this for some time. Then he abandoned this idea and named only three republics: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania (later very easily abandoning the latter). Thus, two republics remained. To smooth out the impression and soften his insistence, the leader of the Soviet state suggested that the Americans also include two or three states in the UN. Roosevelt did not agree to this matter, most likely foreseeing complications in Congress. Moreover, it is interesting that Stalin had a rather convincing reference: India, Australia, New Zealand are all the British Empire, that is, the UK will have plenty of votes in the UN - we need to equalize the chances. That's why the idea of additional USSR votes arose.

Stalin in negotiations with Roosevelt. (pinterest.com)

Compared to Poland, the discussion of the “German question” did not take much time. They talked about reparations, in particular, about the use of the labor of German prisoners of war to repay all the damage caused by the German army during the occupation of Soviet territory. Other issues were also discussed, but there were no objections on them from our allies, England or the United States. Apparently all the energy was focused on discussing the future of Poland.

An interesting detail: when zones of influence in Europe were distributed between the participants (in this case we are talking about Great Britain and the USSR), when Stalin agreed to leave Greece to Great Britain, but did not agree to Poland in any way, our troops were already in Hungary and Bulgaria. Churchill sketched out the distribution on a piece of paper: 90% of Soviet influence in Poland, 90% of British influence in Greece, Hungary or Romania (one of these countries) and Yugoslavia - 50% each. Having written this on a piece of paper, the English Prime Minister pushed the note to Stalin. He looked, and, according to the memoirs of Berezhkov, Stalin’s personal translator, “he returned it to Churchill with a click.” They say there are no objections. According to Churchill himself, Stalin put a tick on the document, right in the middle, and pushed it back to Churchill. He asked: “Shall we burn the piece of paper?” Stalin: “As you wish. You can save it." Churchill folded this note, put it in his pocket and then showed it off. True, the British minister did not fail to remark: “How quickly and not very decently we decide the future of European countries.”

The “Iranian issue” was also touched upon at the Yalta Conference. In particular, he was associated with Iranian Azerbaijan. We were going to create another republic, but the allies, the USA and Great Britain, simply reared up and forced us to abandon this idea.

Big Three leaders at the negotiating table. (pinterest.com)

Now let's talk about the main participants of the conference. Let's start with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Before the meeting in Yalta, the personal physician of the American president, Dr. Howard Bruen, examined Roosevelt to understand his physical condition: whether he could endure the flight, and indeed the conference itself. It was discovered that the president's heart and lungs were fine. True, things were worse with blood pressure - 211 to 113, which probably should have raised alarm bells. But Roosevelt had an enviable character trait: he knew how to get his act together. And the president pulled himself together, showing extraordinary energy, joked, used irony, quickly responded to all the questions that arose, and thereby somewhat reassured his relatives and advisers that everything was in order. But the pallor, yellowness, blue lips - all this attracted attention and gave Roosevelt’s critics grounds to argue that, in fact, the physical condition of the American president explained all his inexplicable concessions to Stalin.

Roosevelt's closest advisers, who were still close to him and bore a certain degree of responsibility for the agreements that were reached, argued that the president was in complete control of himself, aware of everything he said, agreed to and agreed to. “I have succeeded in everything where I could succeed,” Roosevelt said after Yalta in Washington. But this by no means cleared him of the charges.

When Franklin Delano Roosevelt returned home, he spent all his time at his Warm Springs residence. And so on April 12, almost exactly two months after the end of the Yalta meeting, Roosevelt, signing state documents, while the artist Elizaveta Shumatova, invited by the president’s friend, Mrs. Lucy Rutherfurd, was painting his portrait, suddenly raised his hand to the back of his head and said: “ I have a terrible headache." These were the last words of Franklin Roosevelt's life.

It is worth noting that on the eve of April 12, the American president sent his last telegram to Stalin. The fact is that the Soviet leader received information about the meetings of Allen Dulles, the OSS resident in Bern, with General Wolf. Stalin, having learned about this, did not fail to turn to Roosevelt with such, one might say, an unusual letter, expressing protest, even amazement, surprise. How so? We are such friends, we are open all the time in relationships, but here you let us down? Roosevelt responded. Firstly, he said that he was not conducting any negotiations, that this was a continuation of what had been started with Stalin’s consent. But the USSR was not invited to these negotiations, which is why the Soviet leader was indignant. And Roosevelt wrote to Stalin that he really did not want such a minor event to spoil their relationship. And he sent this telegram to Harriman, the US Ambassador to the USSR.

Harriman, on his own initiative, delayed the transmission of the letter to Stalin and sent an urgent coded telegram to Roosevelt that it was not necessary to call this a “minor misunderstanding” - this was a very serious situation. And Roosevelt replied: “I am not inclined to consider this a serious event and continue to consider it simply a misunderstanding.” Thus, the telegram was transmitted to Stalin. And when he received it, the next day Roosevelt was no longer there.

Russian Postage Stamp 1995. (pinterest.com)

Returning to the Yalta Conference, it is worth saying that Stalin, in principle, was pleased with its results. Nowhere and never did he express any dissatisfaction about the fact that he failed in something (this was not in the spirit of the Soviet leader). The meeting in Crimea received an extremely positive assessment: “achieved”, “preserved”, “secured”, “advanced”.

And finally, a few words about ensuring the security of the Yalta Conference. The security of state representatives during the meeting was, of course, the responsibility of the USSR, on whose territory it was held. It is worth noting that all possible forces were involved in protecting and escorting the leaders of the Big Three. Interesting fact: on the way to Livadia, from the car windows, Churchill and Roosevelt observed not only signs of the war that had just subsided, but also a large number of women in military uniform.

The article is based on material from the program “The Price of Victory” of the radio station “Echo of Moscow”. The guest of the program is Eduard Ivanyan, Doctor of Historical Sciences, guest of the “Price of Victory” program on the Ekho Moskvy radio station, and the presenters are Dmitry Zakharov and Vitaly Dymarsky. You can read and listen to the original interview in full at

The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon

The Yalta (Crimean) Conference took place on February 4-11, 1945 at the Livadia Palace in Yalta (Crimea). The conference was attended by leaders of 3 powers: USSR (Stalin), USA (Roosevelt), Great Britain (Churchill). Foreign ministers, chiefs of staff and advisers took part in the conference along with the leaders of the countries. The main question is the post-war world order and the fate of Germany. By this moment, it was absolutely clear that the war had been won and the question of the surrender of Nazi Germany was a matter of several months.

Choosing a conference venue

Planning for the conference began about six months in advance, and the leaders of the countries first spoke about its need in May 1944. Churchill did not express wishes or demands regarding the venue, but Roosevelt suggested holding the meeting in Rome, citing the fact that the US Constitution does not allow him to leave the country for a long time, and he himself can only move in a wheelchair. Stalin rejected this proposal and insisted on holding a conference in Yalta, although Roosevelt also proposed Athens, Alexandria and Jerusalem. He talked about places with warm climates.

By holding a conference in Yalta, in Crimea, Stalin wanted to once again demonstrate the power of the Soviet army, which independently liberated this territory from the German occupiers.

Operation Valley

“Valley” is the code name for the operation to ensure security and other issues of the conference in Crimea. On January 3, Stalin instructed Beria personally to carry out these events. First of all, we determined the locations of the delegates:

Livadia Palace is the location of the US delegation and the venue for the conference.
Vorontsov Palace is the location of the British delegation in Yalta.
The Yusupov Palace is the location of the USSR delegation.

Around January 15, NKVD operational groups began working in Crimea. Counterintelligence was active. More than 67 thousand people were checked, 324 were detained, 197 were arrested. 267 rifles, 283 grenades, 1 machine gun, 43 machine guns and 49 pistols were confiscated from the verified persons. Such counterintelligence activity and unprecedented security measures gave rise to rumors among the population - preparing for war with Turkey. This myth was dispelled later when the reasons for these actions became clear - the holding of an international conference of the heads of the 3 leading world powers in Yalta to discuss issues of further development of Europe and the world.

Issues discussed

War with Japan

At the Yalta Conference, the issue of the USSR's entry into the war against Japan was discussed separately. Stalin said that this was possible, but not earlier than 3 months after the complete surrender of Germany. At the same time, the Soviet leader named a number of conditions for the USSR to enter the war against Japan:

The results of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are annulled, and the USSR returns all territories lost by the tsarist government.
The USSR receives the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin.

The issue of the USSR starting a war with Japan did not raise any big questions, since Stalin was interested in this. It was obvious that Japan would not be able to resist the allied army, and at the cost of little effort it would be possible to win and return the previously lost lands.

All decisions of the Crimean Conference

The Yalta Conference on February 4–11, 1945 produced a document, the main points of which were as follows:

Creation of the United Nations. The first meeting at which the organization's charter was to be developed took place on April 25, 1945 in San Francisco (USA). All countries that were at war with Germany at the time of February 8 could join the UN. It was decided to create the UN Security Council, which included the USSR (successor to Russia), the USA, Great Britain, China and France. All 5 countries have the right of “veto”: imposing a ban on any decision of the organization.
Declaration of the Liberation of Europe. Zones of influence over countries subordinate to Germany were demarcated.
Dismemberment of Germany. It was decided that the USSR, the USA and England would have full power over Germany, taking all measures that they consider justified for the future security of the world. A commission was created by Eden, Winant and Gusev, who were in charge of these issues and had to decide whether France should be involved in the dismemberment process.
Zone of French occupation in Germany. Stalin sharply opposed this idea, saying that France did not fight, and therefore did not have the right to the occupation zone. But if the USA and England consider this acceptable, let them allocate such a zone from their territories to the French. So it was decided.
Reparations. It was decided to create a commission that would determine the amount of reparations. The commission met in Moscow. The payment plan was as follows: one-time (after the defeat of Germany, reparations were withdrawn, which would deprive Germany of its military and economic potential), annually (the duration and volume of annual payments was to be established by a commission) and the use of German labor.
Polish question. The creation of a Provisional Polish Government was approved, the eastern border with the USSR along the Curzon line was approved, and the right to expand Poland to the West and North was recognized. As a result, Poland expanded its territory and received a more democratic government.
Yugoslavia. It was decided later to solve the problems of the country and its borders.
Southeastern Europe. It was decided to create a commission that would solve 3 main problems: 1 - oil equipment in Romania, 2 - Greek claims against Bulgaria, 3 - the creation of a commission on Bulgarian issues.

The Yalta Conference basically did not contain complex issues, since there were agreements. The most pressing issue was reparations from Germany. The Soviet Union demanded reparations of 20 billion dollars, 10 of which were to be allocated to the USSR, and the other 10 to other countries. Churchill was strongly against it, but it was decided to create a separate commission to resolve this issue.

YALTA CONFERENCE 1945, also the Crimean Conference - a conference of the heads of government of the three allied powers of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II 1939–1945 (USSR, USA and Great Britain): Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, US President F.D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister W. Churchill with the participation of foreign ministers, chiefs of senior staff and other advisers. " Big three"(Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill) gathered on February 4–11 in the Livadia Palace near Yalta at a time when, as a result of the offensive of the Soviet Army and the landing of allied troops in Normandy, military operations were transferred to German territory and the war against Nazi Germany entered its final stage. At the Yalta Conference, plans for the final defeat of Germany were agreed upon, the attitude towards Germany after its unconditional surrender was determined, the basic principles of general policy regarding the post-war world order were outlined, and a number of other issues were discussed.

Before Yalta, the British and American delegations met in Malta. Roosevelt intended to continue cooperation with the USSR. In his opinion, Great Britain was an imperialist power, and Roosevelt considered the elimination of the colonial system one of the priorities of the post-war settlement. The United States played a diplomatic game: on the one hand, Great Britain continued to be its closest ally and the atomic project was carried out with the knowledge of London, but in secret from Moscow; on the other hand, Soviet-American cooperation made it possible to implement global regulation of the system of international relations.

In Yalta, as in 1943 at the Tehran Conference, the question of the fate of Germany was again considered. Churchill proposed separating Prussia from Germany and forming a south German state with its capital in Vienna. Stalin and Roosevelt agreed that Germany should be dismembered. However, having made this decision, the Allies did not establish either approximate territorial contours or a procedure for dismemberment.

Roosevelt and Churchill proposed giving France a zone of occupation in Germany, with Roosevelt emphasizing that American troops would not remain in Europe for more than two years. But Stalin did not want to grant this right to France. Roosevelt initially agreed with him. However, Roosevelt then said that if France was included in the Control Commission, which was supposed to govern occupied Germany, this would force the French to make concessions. Stalin, who was met halfway on other issues, agreed to this decision.

The Soviet side raised the issue of reparations (removal of equipment and annual payments) that Germany must pay for the damage caused. However, the amount of reparations was not established, because The British side opposed this. The Americans favorably accepted the Soviet proposal to determine the total amount of reparations at 20 billion dollars, of which 50 percent were to be paid to the USSR.

The Soviet proposal for the membership of Soviet republics in the future UN was accepted, but their number was limited to two (Molotov proposed two or three - Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, citing the fact that the British Commonwealth was represented in full). It was decided to hold the founding conference of the UN in the USA in April 1945. The Soviet side agreed with the American proposals, according to which a permanent member of the Security Council could not take part in the vote if the issue concerned a member country of the Security Council. Roosevelt received the Soviet concession with enthusiasm.

Roosevelt took seriously the principle of UN trusteeship of colonial territories. When the American side presented the corresponding document, Churchill stated that he would not allow interference in the affairs of the British Empire. How, Churchill asked, appealing to the USSR, would Stalin react to the proposal to internationalize Crimea? The American side stated that they meant territories conquered from the enemy, such as islands in the Pacific Ocean. We agreed that the American proposal applies to League of Nations mandated territories, territories taken from the enemy, and territories that voluntarily agree to UN supervision.

The conference discussed a number of issues related to European states. Stalin did not challenge British-American control of Italy, which was still fighting. There was a civil war in Greece, in which British troops intervened on the side opposing the communists. In Yalta, Stalin confirmed the agreement reached with Churchill in October 1944 in Moscow to consider Greece as a purely British sphere of influence.

Great Britain and the USSR, again in accordance with the October agreements, confirmed parity in Yugoslavia, where the leader of the Yugoslav communists, Josip Broz Tito, negotiated with the pro-Western Yugoslav leader Subasic for control of the country. But the practical settlement of the situation in Yugoslavia did not develop as Churchill wanted. The British were also concerned about issues of territorial settlement between Yugoslavia, Austria and Italy. It was decided that these issues would be discussed through normal diplomatic channels.

A similar decision was made regarding the claims of the American and British sides due to the fact that the USSR did not consult with them in solving the problems of the post-war structure of Romania and Bulgaria. The situation in Hungary, where the Soviet side also excluded the Western allies from the political settlement process, was not discussed in detail.

Without any enthusiasm, the conference participants began to discuss the Polish question. By this time, the entire territory of Poland was controlled by Soviet troops; A pro-communist government was formed in this country.

Roosevelt, supported by Churchill, proposed that the USSR return Lviv to Poland. However, this was a ruse; the Polish borders, already discussed in Tehran, were not of concern to Western leaders. In fact, another issue was on the agenda - the post-war political structure of Poland. Stalin repeated the previously agreed position: the western border of Poland should be moved, the eastern border should pass along the Curzon line. As for the Polish government, the Warsaw government will not have any contacts with the London one. Churchill said that according to his information, the pro-Soviet government represents the views of no more than a third of the Poles; the situation could lead to bloodshed, arrests and deportations. Stalin responded by promising to include some “democratic” leaders from Polish emigrant circles in the provisional government.

Roosevelt proposed creating a presidential council in Poland, consisting of representatives of various forces, which would form the Polish government, but soon withdrew his proposal. Long discussions followed. As a result, it was decided to reorganize the provisional Polish government on a “broad democratic basis” and hold free elections as soon as possible. All three powers pledged to establish diplomatic relations with the reorganized government. The eastern border of Poland was determined by the Curzon line; territorial gains at the expense of Germany were mentioned vaguely. The final determination of Poland's western border was delayed until the next conference.

In fact, decisions on the Polish issue and on other European states in Yalta confirmed that Eastern Europe remains in the Soviet, and Western Europe and the Mediterranean in the Anglo-American sphere of influence.

The American side presented a document at the conference entitled “Declaration of a Liberated Europe,” which was adopted. The declaration proclaimed democratic principles. The heads of the allied governments, in particular, assumed obligations to coordinate with each other their policies to resolve the political and economic problems of the liberated countries during the period of “temporary” instability. The Allies had to create conditions for the establishment of democratic forms of government through free elections. However, this declaration was never put into practice.

At the Yalta Conference, an agreement was concluded on the USSR's entry into the war against Japan two to three months after the end of the war in Europe. During separate negotiations between Stalin and Roosevelt and Churchill, agreements were reached to strengthen the position of the USSR in the Far East. Stalin put forward the following conditions: maintaining the status of Mongolia, the return of Southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands to Russia, the internationalization of the port of Dalian (Dalniy), the return to the USSR of the previously Russian naval base in Port Arthur, the joint Soviet-Chinese ownership of the CER and SMR, the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the USSR islands. On all these issues, on the Western side, the initiative for concessions belonged to Roosevelt. The brunt of military efforts against Japan fell on the United States, and they were interested in the speedy appearance of the USSR in the Far East.

The decisions of the Yalta Conference largely predetermined the post-war structure of Europe and the world for almost fifty years, until the collapse of the socialist system in the late 1980s - early 1990s.